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1. Introduction 
To sustain their impressive economic growth and to provide electricity for the two most 
populated states, PR China and India are aggressively developing their energy sector. 
Regenerative energy, mainly hydropower, plays a key role in their present and future 
energy sector strategy. The speed of hydropower development shows a dimension which is 
unique worldwide. This extreme rapid development is mainly based on controversial large 
dams, but also on the fast development of small scaled hydropower projects. 
The following chapter uses a geographical perspective to compare and to analyse the two 
states in their past, present and future hydropower development. Based on a political-
ecological approach the chapter studies the institutional, spatial, environmental and socio-
economic challenges and problems related to hydropower development in China and India. 
Although the focus is on large hydro schemes, and often they are so large that they can even 
referred to as mega-projects, the chapter includes also the development of the small 
hydropower sector. 
The chapter compares and discusses similarities and discrepancies of the hydropower 
development in China and India. First it studies the relevance of the hydropower sector in 
the wider field of power development and power mix and further it discusses spatial as well 
as institutional challenges related to the fast developing hydropower sector. Second the 
chapter analyses in a more detailed scale the massive hydropower development in Asia’s 
water tower, which is the transition area between Northeast-India and Southwest-China. 
This region has worldwide the highest potential in hydropower development and is 
therefore tagged as one of the world’s future power houses or batteries. It shows the spatial 
consequences from that development and discusses it in its institutional, environmental and 
socio-economic implications. The last paragraph goes beyond that region and studies the 
conflicts and trends of internationalising hydropower business in Asia, mainly in the 
adjacent transboundary watersheds.  
The chapter is based on extensive field work in China, mainly in Yunnan and on minor field 
work in India. The author visited many existing hydropower stations and potential 
hydropower locations and conducted semi-structured interviews during several field visits 
between 2009 and 2011 with researchers, members of hydropower companies, government 
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officials, and policy advisors. Further interviews were conducted with representatives of 
foreign non-governmental organisations and consultants doing services in China and India 
as well as with other researchers working on the topic in China. Given the delicate political 
nature of the issue, all interviewees from China were anonymity assured. 
2. Overview of China’s and India’s power sector 
2.1 Present state of the power sector in the two countries 
China and India are the two most populated countries in the world. Additionally the 
economic growth rate of both countries belongs to the highest in the world and the GDP-
growth has also maintained high over a long period. The national economic growth in both 
nations is inevitably accompanied with an increasing demand for energy in general and 
electric power in particular. To sustain their impressive economic growth both states have 
been developing aggressively their energy sector. The challenge of their rapidly growing 
energy and power sector in the 21st century is unparalleled in the world. Finding a proper 
solution for this energy bottleneck will determine the economic, social and sustainable 
future of China as well as of India.  
A key issue within the present and future energy sector strategy is to solve the generation 
and supply of electrical energy. On one side the power sector hast to grow slightly faster 
than the GDP-growth and on the other side is the present need for power for an average 
Chinese and Indian merely 1 kW/person, which is far inadequate compared to 11 
kW/person for an average US person and ~ 3.5 to 5.5 kW/person for a Western European 
(Cahen & Lubimorsky, 2008, as cited in Chang et al. 2010).  
 
Fig. 1. Comparing China’s and India’s total installed power capacity for selected years  
Despite the fact that the challenges of the power sector are in many ways similar, the present 
state of the sector varies considerably between the two nations [cp. Fig. 1]. Compared to 
India, China had from the beginning a higher installed capacity as well as a higher energy 
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production output. Over the years the gap between the two nations grew steadily. In the 
beginning of both nations (late 1940s) the installed capacity was with 1.8 GW (China) and 
1.4 GW (India) quite low. Today (Dec 2010) China’s installed capacity is 962 GW, while 
India’s part grew to 171 GW. In mid-2011 China exceeded as the second country the 1,000 
GW of installed capacity and soon it will lap the USA as the world’s country with the 
highest installed capacity.  
The growth of the Chinese energy sector is so impressive, that in less than two years China 
adds a new installed capacity which is similar to the total installed capacity of a strong West 
European economy like Germany or France. This fact is even more impressive, when it gets 
considered that since 2007 China closed about 77 GW of old, small and inefficient thermal 
power plants.  
Despite the strong growth China’s power sector faces cyclic shortages, the latest were in 
2002-05 and in 2010. Contrary to the temporary Chinese power problems, is the Indian 
power sector characterized by a chronicle deficit, which is still about 7%. India’s actual 
shortage would be much higher when the peak demand is considered as well as the 
unscheduled power cuts. The ambitious goal of the Indian government solving that problem 
by 2012 seems rather unrealistic.  
2.1.1 Thermal power 
It is well known for both countries that the primary energy resource is coal. About two third 
of the installed capacity is thermal power (mainly coal, but also gas and petroleum); its 
share in the energy production output is even higher. Similar in both countries is also that 
the coalfields are quite far away from the load centres. Additionally India lacks on sufficient 
high quality coal, China only to some extent. For that reasons coal either has to get 
transported over long distances which affects the efficiency of the railways or they have to 
get imported from other nations (e.g. from Indonesia, South Africa, Australia, etc.). In 
particular for China’s booming South Coast it is cheaper to import the coal from abroad, 
rather than transport it from Northern China.  
To solve India’s serious power shortage the government pursues the construction of huge 
‘hubs’ of thermal power stations around selected sea ports. Mainly based on imported coal, 
state-owned as well as private power companies construct here large thermal power 
stations. In those hubs the Indian government allows also smaller power plants which often 
cause serious environmental impacts. 
While China’s power generation is mostly in the hands of a few state-owned and to some 
extend also provincial owned generation companies, the share of India’s private sector in 
capacity expansion has gone up substantially over the past decade. It is expected that its 
share is growing from presently one third to 50 per cent of the total incremental capacity 
over the next Five Year Plan (2012-17).   
2.1.2 Nuclear power and renewables 
Beside the massive development for thermal power stations both countries are seriously 
working in diversifying their power mix and reducing the ratio of carbon emissions. One 
option has been massive investments in nuclear power development, which plays so far in 
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both states only a minor role. Despite its scheduled impressive absolute growth rate, 
relatively nuclear power plays also in future only a minor role. Due to the Fukushima 
accident in early 2011, China put some of its nuclear plans on hold, while India is 
proceeding with its nuclear ambitions. 
Another option for reducing carbon emissions and diversifying the power portfolio is the 
development of renewables. In both countries are the absolute growth rates impressive, also 
they started at a relative low level. India is here relative more successful than China. 
Massive investments will boost the installed capacity of Wind, PV and Solar energy. Both 
countries have large territories and one challenge is that the generation areas are far away 
from the load centres. Massive investments in the relevant transmission system are due to 
the unstable generation of renewables often not justified. 
Under the above premise solely hydropower is the only real alternative to thermal power, 
for it is considered as a renewable, clean and cost-effective resource. Its relevance has also to 
be seen in the context of reducing carbon emissions and dependency on fossil energy 
resources as well as of optimizing the power portfolio (base vs. peak load).  
Following is explained the relevance of the hydropower sector in the present and future 
power scenarios, but it should get distinguished between the small and large hydropower 
sector. 
  
Fig. 2. Comparing the power mix of China’s and India’s total installed capacity in 2010 
2.2 Role of the hydropower sector in the present and future power scenarios 
Parallel to the rapid development of China’s and India’s power sector in general increased 
also their hydropower sector. 
In 2010 out of the 962 GW of Chinese installed capacity, immense 213 GW or 22% were 
generated through hydropower. The same 22% is also India’s hydropower generation, but 
this is absolute only 38 GW.  
In the global context China ranks first and has by far the highest installed hydropower 
capacity (cp. Tab. 1). The 213 GW (2010) are so high, that it almost exceeds the cumulative 
installed capacity of the USA, Canada and Brazil which rank second, third and fourth. India 
ranks regarding the installed capacity after Russia on place six.  
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Table 1. Comparison of the world’s largest hydropower producers regarding installed 
capacity and annual hydroelectric production for 2008. Notice: Except China there are no 
substantial changes in other countries between 2008 and 2010  
(Data compiled by author from different sources; 2008 data: World Energy Council. 2010 
Survey of Energy Sources) 
2.2.1 Brief overview about historical hydropower development 
Before the present and future role of the Chinese and Indian hydropower sector is 
discussed, a brief historical overview is given. The Sidrapong hydropower station near 
Darjeeling (2*65 kW; later renewed and increased), finished in 1897, was India’s first 
hydropower station; while China’s first one was built in 1912 in Shilongba (2*240 kW), near 
Yunnan’s provincial capital of Kunming.  
With the founding of their nations in the late 1940s China and India had only a specific 
number of smaller and a very limited number of larger hydropower stations. This situation 
was very different from Europe and the United States, which had at that time not only a 
bigger number of dams but also larger hydropower stations constructed. The US Hoover’s 
Dam initial 1,345 MW power plant, constructed in the early 1930s on the Colorado River, 
was at that time by far the world’s largest hydro dam. Only a decade later it was already 
eclipsed by the 6,809 MW of the Grand Coulee Dam on the river Columbia. 
The situation began changing in the 1950s. In particular in the context of the early 
industrialization of that period the hydropower sector developed fast in China and India. At 
that time both states were supported and assisted in their hydropower programmes by the 
Soviet Union. In particular larger projects incl. dams were very prestigious for the young 
nations, although they required large initial capital outlays. The large dams of that time 
were mostly multipurpose projects and hydropower generation was only of minor 
relevance and often justified the large irrigation investments related to that projects. 
In both countries the relative share of the hydropower sector grew fast and reached its peak 
about 30 years ago. In India it was in the late 1970s as the installed capacity was almost 40% 










PR China (2010) 213,4 22,2 721,0 1.753
PR China 171,0 21,5 580,0 1.753
United States 79,5 5,8 254,8 376
Canada 73,4 61,1 377,4 536
Brazil 77,5 85,6 365,1 818
Russia 49,7 17,6 180,0 852
India 36,9 15,8 115,6 442
Norway 28,3 98,2 140,1 206
2008
% of total 
capacity
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peak of the highest hydropower share in the energy portfolio was almost a decade later and, 
compared to India, the peak was also less (around 30%). Today in both countries the share 
of the hydropower sector is declining rapidly although the absolute growth is impressive. 
The relative energy output is declining even faster. 
2.2.2 Hydropower potential 
China and India combine together about two third of the world’s 45,000 large dams. The 
figure includes dams over 15 m in height or, if less, the reservoir should have a capacity of 
more than three million cubicmeter. Despite the fact that China and India have combined 
more than one third of the global gross installed hydropower capacity, is their development 
level still quite low.  
The exploitable hydropower potential has been analysed in both states by different national 
large-scaled general surveys. China’s latest and fourth survey was published in 2005, whereas 
India’s last re-assessment studies were completed in 1987. In consequence from these surveys 
both countries identified major hydropower bases; India six and China fourteen, whereas the 
Yarlung Tsangpo is officially not recognized as a base so far (cp. Fig 3).  
The stage of development can vary considerably between these hydropower bases. In those 
surveys it gets distinguished between the technically exploitable and the economic 
exploitable capacity, whereas the first is naturally far higher. For China the economic 
exploitable hydropower potential is assessed to 402 GW (1,750 TWh/a), while that for India 
is 149 GW (660 TWh/a).  
The core of that potential is located in the southern adjusting mountain ranges of the Tibetan 
plateau, which is ranging from the Karakorum over the Himalaya up to the Hengduan 
mountains. This region has globally the highest hydropower potential and is therefore 
called Asia’s water tower. Within that water tower the key region for the present 
hydropower development is the transition area between the states of Northeastern India 
(mainly Arunachal Pradesh) via Myanmar to the Southwest Chinese provinces (mainly 
Yunnan and Sichuan). The present state of hydropower development in that region as well 
as potential future projects are discussed in chapter 3.2.  
2.3 Spatial and institutional challenges of hydropower development 
Neither in China nor in India hydraulic resources with their extremely uneven distribution 
do match with regional economic development (Chang et al. 2010). The economic hubs with 
their often high energy demand, which are in China the Southern and Eastern coastal 
regions and in India selected metropoles of South- and West-India, are mostly far away 
from the hydropower generation areas.  
To get the electric energy to these far away load centres a robust, efficient and expensive high-
voltage transmission system is required. In that context it is not amazing that in particular 
China and to some extend also India are increasingly using UHVDC (ultra high voltage DC) 
for long distances transmission. This is presently the technically most advanced technology 
and has only minor losses, although it is far more expensive than the common high voltage 
AC lines. Quite a few countries are using worldwide this technique, but often only over short 
distances. China developed over the past few years the world’s most powerful DC lines. It 
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should be already here indicated that the development of hydropower is a major driver for the 
development of the globally most advanced transmission technologies.  
 
Fig. 3. Economic exploitable hydropower potential of China’s and India’s hydropower bases 
as well as of selected neighbouring states. 
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Another challenge of hydropower development is the fact that most of the key hydropower 
bases are affected by the monsoon climate with its uneven intra- and inter-annual runoff 
distribution which causes great differences between rainy and dry seasons. This results in a 
large quantity of non-beneficial spillage during the rainy season and a deficient generation 
in the dry season. Then hydropower has to get compensated mainly by support from 
thermal power. To reduce this discrepancy both countries are also investing heavy in the 
construction of pumped storage systems. Compared to the large scaled hydropower 
stations, the large scaled pumped storage projects are mainly located near the load centres. 
In 2010 China had a hydropower storage capacity of 14.6 GW, which ranks third in the 
world. But in an ambitious programme it should almost triple to 41 GW over till 2020 
(Reuters, 9 June 2010).  
India’s hydropower storage capacity is presently merely 5 GW, but is also growing slowly.  
Most of the hydro projects in China and even more in India are not developed solely for 
power generation and are therefore multipurpose in nature. Due to the large initial capital 
outlays for these projects, hydropower provides often the means to pay for required 
irrigation and related food security as well as for water supply or flood control. In particular 
the early prestigious projects were multipurpose dams, in which the primary purpose was 
mostly irrigation. The problem is that the timing for irrigation often competes with the main 
demand for power generation.  
Only over the past decade many projects have been constructed in more suitable humid and 
mountainous areas, where hydropower became either the solely purpose or it has been the 
major one. Irrigation plays in most of the recent projects a less crucial role and therefore 
flood control and improved navigation become beside power generation a primary purpose. 
Large hydropower projects require also large capital investments which are often, except for 
limited prestigious projects, even for governments difficult to arrange. China and India were 
for long no exceptions, but for China the situation changed over the past decade. 
China became due to its growing economic and financial strength less dependent on foreign 
sources for the financing of its dams. Only at certain projects the Worldbank (WB) or Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) has been get involved; the 3,300 MW Ertan hydropower station in 
Szechuan province is a famous example. Built in the late 1990s it was largest hydropower 
project before the Three Gorges Dam China’s. Finished before the World Commission on 
Dams published its strategic priorities for improved decision-making, management and 
planning of dams, Ertan received one of the largest single project credits from the 
Worldbank and it was China’s first hydropower plant to be built through international 
bidding as China’s first 200m dam.  
China’s provinces have been funding only a few large hydropower stations, mainly relevant 
projects to sustain their own energy needs; hence the majority of the recent and future large 
and prestigious hydropower stations are funded by the central government. This situation 
of financing so many large hydropower projects by a state government is worldwide 
unique. China’s main challenges of ongoing large hydropower projects are the resettlement 
issues including related costs. There are currently about 23 million registered relocates in 
China (Hensengerth, 2010), if the number of former past projects is included, the figure is 
much higher. The consequences caused by resettlements (social implications, large costs, 
etc.) are a key reason that there are hardly any new large and present hydropower projects 
in the densely populated Eastern part of China.  
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Compared to China’s financial strength, India still has great difficulties to mobilize finances 
for the implementation of its planned large hydropower schemes.  Therefore it can presently 
only fund a few large, public projects that are considered of national importance. 
Alternative funding is for India quite important. It still relies on financial institutes (e.g. WB,  
ADB or International Finance Corporation) and on cooperations with international agencies 
(e.g. Germany’s KfW) or private partners (e.g. Norway’s Statkraft). Parallel is India seriously 
looking for tapping into the BOT market while allowing private hydro developers 
(Ramunathan & Abeygunawardena, 2007).  
In the context of the challenging power and energy sector incl. the large financial constraints 
related to it, both countries initiated various reforms of the energy market inclusive the 
hydropower sector. Following is given a short overview over these reforms. 
 
Fig. 4. Major drivers and actors of China’s as well as India’s hydropower development. 
2.3.1 Reforms of India’s electricity and power market  
India’s power market was already opened in 1991 and various policy initiatives were taken 
for increasing the hydro capacity and the participation of private entrepreneurs. Despite 
these efforts in 2007 the public sector had still a predominant share of 97%. In one of the 
initiatives the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) prepared in 2001 a vision document 
giving a road map for expediting hydropower. In that report about 400 schemes totaling 
about 107 GW have been ranked from the point of view of attractiveness. In a further step 
the status of a Mega Hydropower Projects were introduced with the goal for bringing 
substantially down tariffs due to reduced levies, taxes, etc. The threshold for a Hydro-Mega-
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Project is 500 MW and 350 MW for peripheral place like Northeast India, Sikkim and Jammu 
& Kashmir. In another move a three stage clearance procedure should encourage private 
entrepreneurs to enter into the otherwise high risk hydropower investments. Stage I results 
in a pre-feasibility report; stage II in a detailed project report (incl. also pre-construction 
activities, infrastructure development and related land acquisition) and under stage III the 
investment decision will be given after approval of all the documents.  
Despite these initiatives almost all the Mega Hydropower Projects are owned and invested 
either by the central- or by state owned power generation companies or corporations (cp. 
Fig. 4). So far the 1,000 MW Karcham Wangtoo hydro scheme in Himachal Pradesh 
(commissioned in 2011) is the only private funded Mega hydropower project; however in 
Northeast India a few more are under construction or in planning. An overview over the 
present and future multiple hydro schemes in Northeast India, which distinguish in certain 
ways from the rest of India, is given in chapter 3.2.1. 
To encourage hydropower development as well as looking for a tool for local development 
in peripheral regions, the Indian Prime Minister launched in 2003 in a landmark move the so 
called ‘50,000 MW hydro initiative’. Under this scheme preliminary feasibility reports for 
162 large and medium sized projects with a capacity of 47.9 GW were prepared. Out of these 
162 schemes, 133 are in the Indian Himalayan Region (IHR), mainly in Arunachal Pradesh.  
Contrary to large hydro schemes, medium to smaller hydropower projects in India are 
funded and allocated by a competing market of diverse public and private companies. In 
particular its Ministry of New & Renewable Energy encourages and supports small 
hydropower projects. Additionally the CDM market attracts hydropower investments, in 
mid-2011 about 80 hydropower projects are already registered and another 120 projects are 
at validation (http://cd4cdm.org; 09.Sept.2011). 
India’s hydropower development has also to be seen in the context of building up a strong 
and vibrant national grid which so far is quite fragmented and split into five regional grids. 
Today almost half of India’s present power transmission is done by regional grids or private 
funded transmission lines. The latter permit in particular for high energy consuming 
enterprises a direct commercial relationship to a generation company; some of the large 
hydropower stations have such an arrangement.  
Avoiding a further fragmentation was 1991 the national Indian Power Grid Company 
incorporated, which carries now about 51% of the India’s generated power. One of its major 
objectives is creating a strong and vibrant national grid. Therefore it already gained that 
four of the five Indian regional grids are now operating synchronously. Another objective is 
connecting the regional grids with that of neighboring states like Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Bhutan.  
2.3.2 Reforms of China’s electricity and power market  
With the breakup of the former Chinese Ministry of Energy in 1997 and the subsequent State 
Power Corporation in 2002 the Chinese power generation was separated from the grid but 
also from the projection. The state power monopoly was in the context of generation split 
into five national generation holdings (so called ‘Big Five’: Huaneng, Datang, Guodian, 
Huadian and China Power Investment) and later came along the Three Gorges Corporation 
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as the six major hydroelectricity generation company. These six national holdings control a 
major part of the Chinese power generation and regarding large hydro schemes they 
control, beside some provincial owned holdings, the market almost exclusively (Hennig, 
2007).  
Similar to India only a few larger hydro projects are also funded by private companies, 
whereas they often have an affinity to the political circles in Beijing. The smaller the hydro 
projects become, that often private entrepreneurs and also local cooperatives invest in 
hydropower, most of these private investors come from the economic boosting areas of 
Coastal China. A more detailed overview is given in chapter 3.2.  
China’s policies designed to support hydropower are formulated at different levels. Chief 
among them is the Programme for the development of the Western Regions, officially 
instituted in 2001. Mainly infrastructure development (incl. hydropower) is seen as a key 
instrument for closing the disparity gap between the rich coastal Chinese provinces and the 
poor interior western provinces. Under that framework falls also the policy of Send Western 
Electricity East and Send Yunnan Electricity to Guangdong, another policy is the Rural 
Electrification Programme which promotes more local and also smaller hydropower 
development (Magee, 2006; Tullos et al., 2010) 
Due to the above indicated facts that most of the hydropower regions are far away from the 
load centers the various grids and transmission lines play a crucial role in both countries. 
Until recently the Chinese provinces as well as the Indian states owned mostly their own 
grids. In the context of the above mentioned Chinese power reforms, two large power grid 
holdings emerged: China Southern Power Grid Company which is in charge of five South-
Chinese provinces and the State Grid Corporation which controls the rest of China. Over the 
last years all the provinces got interconnected in one of the two grids, except Tibet where it 
is due to the difficult terrain still under construction. As the first country worldwide China 
started in 2009 a powerful long-distance high-capacity power transmission technology using 
direct current. Aiming to bring more power from its remote western and northern regions to 
the energy-hungry East and South coasts, China is the only country in the world which 
plans to build large ultra-high voltage (UHV) power-line networks. For that goal four other 
major lines are under construction or were finished in the last two years.  
2.4 Brief introduction of China’s and India’s small hydropower sector  
There is no internationally consensus on the definition of small hydropower (SHP). In 
Europe is the generally accepted norm 10 MW (European Small Hydropower Association), 
while in India it refers to a capacity up to 25 MW and in China depending on the context 
between 25 and even 50 MW.  
In India SHP was neglected over a long time. Only after the present and renamed Ministry 
of New and Renewable Energy was formed in 1992, the development of SHP projects 
acquired good pace. However the policy and therefore the implementation varies 
considerably between the Indian states. India is planning to increase the SHP power 
generation capacity from present 900 MW (2009) to about 7,000 MW by the end of the 12 
year plan (2017). From the potential 5,415 identified SHP-sites, merely about 800 have been 
implemented so far (Nautiyal et al., 2011). Except for remote villages, mainly in the 
Himalaya, most of India’s SHPs are feeding into the regional as well as the national grids. 
Naturally the largest potential is in the Himalayan states and along the Western Ghats.  
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Also due to the other definition of SHP, China’s potential as well as its implemented 
capacity is far higher. Already in 2005 more than 40,000 SHPs had an installed capacity of 38 
GW and an annual average power generation of 130 TWh, which was about one third of the 
total hydropower generation in that year (Huang & Yan, 2009). China’s major backbone for 
rural electrification has for long been SHP and about 653 rural counties had achieved 
preliminary electrification from SHPs. Today, with the rise to about 55 GW installed SHP 
capacity (in 2009) China’s SHP sector has become a major grid feeding player. Despite its 
strong growth, the development is still far below its estimated potential of 128 GW capacity 
and 450 TWh/y average generation (Huang & Yan, 2009).  
Additionally China has been establishing about 15 bases and Yunnan province another two 
bases, each having a capacity of about 1,000 MW each, which mainly consists of small 
hydropower projects. These SHP-bases are a specific and unique characteristic of China’s 
ambitious SHP development. Their development is mainly driven by private entrepreneurs 
as well as local governments and local power grids.  
3. Hydropower development in Asia’s watertower 
3.1 Common natural and cultural heritage of the case study areas - the key region 
between SW-China and NE-India 
As mentioned above the southern adjusting mountain ranges of the Tibetan plateau, which 
are ranging from the Karakorum over the Himalaya up to the Hengduan Mountains, have 
the world’s largest hydropower potential and supply water for almost half of the global 
population and regulate the climate in upland and lowland areas of Asia adjacent to it 
(Jianchu, 2007). Within that region, the core area for present hydropower development is the 
transition area between the states of Northeastern India (mainly Arunachal Pradesh) and the 
Southwest Chinese provinces (mainly Yunnan). This key region for hydropower 
development features, despite its present political splitting into different states, 
geographically a similar natural as well as cultural characteristic. It can even be regarded as 
one cultural landscape. 
Following is given a short introduction of that region. 
3.1.1 Environmental diversity 
The Tibetan Plateau in general and its south-eastern extension (incl. its adjacent mountain 
ranges) in particular play as part of the ‘Asian water tower’ a crucial role. Some of the 
world’s largest rivers with their tributaries flow through the region (e.g. Yarlung 
Tsangpo/Brahmaputra; Jinsha/Yangtze; Lancang/Mekong;  Nu/Salween, and Irrawaddy). 
In that region the rivers change their topography (hydraulic gradient) from plateau via a 
long transition area with often deep gorge topography or rain-drenched Himalayan slopes 
to that of lowland topography and landlocked alluvial plains. Combined with its wide range 
of climatic setting is the region one of the global core areas for hydropower development, 
both that of larger scale as well as of smaller scale. 
The area is a product of the collision and subduction of the Indian subcontinent with 
Eurasia, resulting in an impressive geodiversity but also in a fragile geological base and 
active seismic-tectonic instability. This unique physiogeographic setting includes with the 
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Eastern Himalaya and the Hengduan Mountains some of the highest mountain ranges in the 
world. But it includes also diverse Karst landscapes and huge plateaus and basins. The 
territory’s geodiversity, combined with a climatic setting that ranges from tropical to 
temperate, has led to a unique diversity of ecosystems: from tropical rainforests in the south 
to shrub and grasslands in the mountainous north.  
This small region is part of three of the world’s major biodiversity ‘hotspots’ and several 
important ecoregions (WWF 2001). Alone the province of Yunnan hosts about half of 
China’s biodiversity and boasts the second highest species abundance index in Southeast-
Asia (Kwai Wong, 2005) and Northeastern India houses 21% of India’s important bird areas, 
identified as per international criteria (Vagholikar & Das, 2010). Larger areas in that region 
are still poorly documented and biologists have been discovered in recent years a number of 
new species including large mammals. 
3.1.2 Heritage and ethnic diversity  
For more than 2000 years the region and in particular areas of today’s Yunnan province 
were a major trade hub along the southwestern silk road connecting China with the 
economic centres of Southeast Asia, Tibet and India. The regions long and outstanding role 
in regional trading history has led to thousands of years of migration in and out of the 
region. While many of the migrant groups were small and assimilated with the local 
population, several were big enough to establish independent local and regional empires 
(e.g. bronze-age Dian-culture, medieval Nanzhao and its successor, the Dali empire and the 
medieval Ahom empire; Hennig & Linde, 2008). 
A result of this history is a remarkable ethnic and cultural diversity, which makes this 
region the ethnic-richest area in India as well as China. Most of the hydropower projects 
under construction and / or planned are situated in areas inhabited by these minorities. 
3.1.3 Economic potential and regional commitments and initiatives 
Northeast India is a collective term for the eight states of that area, which are connected to 
the subcontinent only via the 22 km narrow Siliguri corridor, which is popularly referred as 
Chicken’s neck. Hence, the region is similar to Yunnan in a peripheral and economic 
disadvantaged position. In spite of massive infrastructure improvements the economic and 
political centres of both countries are still far away.  
Despite this economic disadvantage the region has the privilege to be a key passage 
between China and India as well as to Southeast Asia. Therefore it is in a good 
geostrategic position regarding favourable revenue arrangements and allocating funds for 
regional infrastructure development, mainly construction and upgrading of roads, 
railways, waterways, and pipelines. This infrastructure development has to be seen in the 
context of the rapid economic growth which causes a seeking for additional resources, 
trade- and market links to sustain it (Hennig & Linde, 2008). Therefore both countries 
expand their bilateral partnerships - often based on already existing political 
dependencies and patronages as well as increasingly engaging in multilateral 
partnerships. Fostering such transboundary economic partnerships are particularly 
beneficial to both regions due to their proximity to the other side and to the Southeast 
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Asia. But it has so far not affected a joint hydropower development or even a joint 
watershed development initiative. Two major examples for the regions engagement in 
joint development cooperations are the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic 
Cooperation Programme, and the track-II Kunming Initiative. 
Among the various rich ‘green resources’ hydropower is becoming in both regions a key 
pillar, both for the large as well as for the small hydropower sector.  
3.2 Present state of hydropower development (incl. upcoming projects) 
Despite the above mentioned similar common cultural and natural heritage, the 
hydropower development is very much affiliated by its political ties, therefore it will be 
separately described and only later jointly assessed.  
3.2.1 Northeast-India 
In mid-2011 India has been developed only 25.6% of its present economic exploitable 
hydropower potential of 149 GW. Three quarter or 117 GW of India’s hydropower 
potential is located in the Indian Himalayan Region, an area which accounts contrary only 
for approximately 18% of India’s total geographical area. Within the Himalayan Region 
more than half (=63.3 GW) comes in the Brahmaputra Basin of NE-India (Agrawal et al., 
2010).  
Beside the main stem of the Brahmaputra, which is known in China and Tibet as the 
Yarlung Tsangpo and in Arunachal Pradesh as Siang, there are few major tributaries, each 
having a large hydropower potential. While the Tista is draining Sikkim and West Bengal 
and the Barak Manipur and Assam, all the other relevant tributaries are in Arunachal 
Pradesh. Most of those North-Bank tributaries of the Brahmaputra are of Himalayan origin 
and are fed by glaciers in their upper reaches, e.g. Subansiri, Kameng (Jia Bhareli), Dibang, 
Lohit, etc.  
Due to the fact that more than 40% of India’s hydropower potential comes from the 
Brahmaputra Basin, the region and in particular Arunachal has been proactively tagged as 
the ‘future powerhouse’ of India.   
The focus for massive hydropower development in the Northeast of India was pushed by 
the Indian Central Government. With the gradual liberalisation of hydropower policies, 
the Indian states were allowed to invite private players. Sikkim kick-started this process 
about ten years ago allowing private companies exploiting the hydropower of the Tista 
river and its tributaries. Today the tiny Sikkim-State is together with Arunachal  
Pradesh at the forefront in the initiative to sign multiple Memoranda of 
Understanding/Agreement (MoU/MoA) with private and public power developers. 
Alone the state of Arunachal Pradesh allotted hydro schemes with a capacity of more than 
40 GW till 2010 and most of these projects involve private Indian players (Vagholikar & 
Das, 2010). The impressive share of private entrepreneurs is contrary to the national trend. 
It is also fostered by the above mentioned initiatives by the national government as well 
as the state policy.  
So far only 423 MW of the exploitable hydro resources have been developed in Arunachal, 
which is merely 1% of its potential. By 2012, the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri Scheme will be  
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Fig. 5. Map of present and forthcoming large hydropower projects (above 500 MW) in Asia. 
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commissioned and from then onwards Arunachal Pradesh becomes an exporter of 
electricity. It is the first Mega-Project in that region and it will be operated by the state 
owned NHPC.  
So far the Northeastern power grid is the most inefficient one in India and in particular the 
distribution is the weakest link in the power system. With almost 40% the transmission and 
distribution losses are the highest in India and far above the Indian average. In some regions 
the losses range up to two third of the generation (Rao, 2006). The construction of an 
efficient transmission system is a key issue of the regions hydropower development.  
The transmission system for power evacuation from the Northeast is of serious geopolitical 
interest. Actually it should get finished at the end of the present five year plan in 2012 as a 
800 kV HVDC bi-pole line and a 400 kV double circuit AC lines in a hybrid system, which 
would be one of the global most advanced transmission lines. This forthcoming 
transmission corridor, which requires a stretch of about 800 to 1,200 m, should at a later 
stage evacuate 25-35 GW of electricity mainly to energy hungry Northern and Western 
India. It has to pass through the geopolitical sensitive narrow Siliguri corridor and should 
later also include hydro generated power from Sikkim as well as from Bhutan and Myanmar 
(Rao, 2006; CEA, 2008).  
But due to lack of central funding the prestigious project is seriously delayed. Alternatively 
the Indian government is seriously looking for a cheaper version passing through 
Bangladesh. Additionally India tries to increase private investments of such geostrategic 
important transmission lines as well as to increase the power and capacity of those lines in 
order to reduce land requirements and transmission losses (Planning Commission of India 
2011). 
All the project developers of Northeast India need to obtain a Long Term Open Access for 
transmitting power through the corridor. The first mega hydro projects which will be 
gradually commissioned over the next years, will be located on the Brahmaputra-tributaries 
more close to the Indian mainland (rivers Kameng and Subansiri respectively). They will be 
projects by public funding, either by NHPC or by NEEPCO. India’s presently largest 
privately funded project is the 2,700 MW Lower Siang project on the main stem of the 
Brahmaputra. It is owned by Jaypee Power Ventures and should be completed by 2017. That 
project is like other private funded projects on BOT bases, which means the owner is the 
local state (e.g. Gvt. of Arunachal Pradesh) and the investing company gets over a 
concession period of 40 years the right of utilisation.  
Due to environmental and social concerns various Indian State Governments (including 
Arunachal) encouraged the development of run-off-river (RoR) type hydro projects. Quite a 
few of formerly scheduled storage schemes in the Pre-Feasibility Reports were converted 
into RoR-schemes, either as one big one or as 2 to 3 smaller ones.  
The controversial upper Siang project (about 10,000 MW) on the Brahmaputra/ Yarlung 
Tsangpo would be by far India’s largest hydropower station. Due to China’s recently 
published plans for future development of the Yarlung Tsangpo, India revived immediately 
its plans for the prestigious project. As such a large scaled and scoped hydel project has 
never been attempted in India, it is presently discussed to hive off the project into two or 
even three modules, so as to keep better tab on costs and aid implementation (cp. chapter 
4.2). 
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3.2.2 Southwest-China (Yunnan-province) 
The Southwest Chinese provinces are the backbone of China’s ambitious present and future 
hydropower development and within that area the province of Yunnan is the focus for 
China’s forthcoming hydropower expansion plans. 
The ambitious programme makes Yunnan, which is in its size almost comparable to 
Germany, in a few years to the world’s most powerful hydropower base. It will then have 
the largest installed hydropower capacity as well as the largest annual hydropower 
production, more than states like the USA, Canada, Brazil or Norway. 
What is the backbone for this development? 
The principal item is the construction of large and even mega hydropower projects on the 
major rivers and along their tributaries (Hennig, 2009 & 2007; Dore & Xiaogang 2004), 
secondary also the development of smaller hydropower bases. For Yunnan are three rivers 
special relevant; the Jinsha river, which is the upper part of the Yangtze river; the Lancang 
or Mekong river and the Nu or Salween river. The proposed power stations on the main 
stem of these rivers are all planned as cascade systems. Most of the projects will be very 
large ones, and often they are designed as run-off-river systems, where parts of the river are 
diverted through huge tunnels. Only a few projects are designed as huge reservoirs and are 
in combination with a large installed capacity even called mega-projects.  
The Jinsha has by far the highest hydropower potential worldwide. Not in Yunnan, but on 
the Yangtze is also presently the world’s largest hydropower station in terms of installed 
capacity (20,300 MW); the Three Gorges Dam. Its first commercial operation began in 2008. 
The owner, China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC), is presently constructing a cascade of 
four other hydropower stations on the Jinsha river, which have a combined capacity double 
that of the Three Gorges Dam. Two of the projects (Baihetan and Xiluodu) belong to the 
largest worldwide. Presently China is one of the few countries which uses 700 MW turbines. 
But based on Jinsha’s Wudongde and Baihetan hydropower stations, China gets as the first 
country the ability for independently design and manufacture the world's largest 
hydropower-generating single units (1,000 MW).  
In the upper reaches of the Jinsha is a second cascade under construction. Originally it 
should be a cascade of 8 major dams, but one was cancelled due to environmental and social 
concerns. A few other dams were stopped for a while due to environmental problems (see 
next chapter). The cascade is developed by the Jinsha Hydropower Development Corp., but 
the projects are mostly owned by different state owned companies. The 2,400 MW 
Jin'anqiao-project is not only the first commissioned project of the cascade (in 2011), it is also 
China’s first large hydropower station invested by a private company, Hanergy. 
The Lancang or Mekong river reduces in Yunnan its altitude difference by 1,780 m and has 
therefore a high potential. The lower cascade of proposed 8 dams is Yunnan’s first major 
hydropower project. It is now developed by Hydrolancang, a subsidiary of Huaneng 
company. The 1,500 MW Manwan Dam completed in 1995 was the first dam on the Mekong 
and also Yunnan’s first major dam. Its funding had at that time model character, because no 
international donors were included. With the second dam (Dachaoshan; 1,350 MW; 
commissioned in 2003) Yunnan became a power exporter. The third dam (Jinghong; 1,750 
MW; commissioned in 2009), was China’s first hydropower joint venture with a foreign 
country (Thailand). After completing a 1,070 km long transmission line, Thailand will be 
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also a primary consumer of electricity generated by the dam. With the fourth dam, Xiaowan 
(4,200 MW; finished in 2010), China exceeded its 200 MW installed hydropower capacity. 
Presently it is China’s second largest dam but in a decade it will be only of a ‘mid-ranged’ 
size. On the upper part of the Lancang/Mekong China is presently starting a second 
hydropower-cascade. But due to concerns of the lower Mekong riparian states its details are 
still not finalized.  
The proposed cascade of 13 dams along the Nu/Salween river raised international attention, 
because it has been still halted due to environmental concerns. Background is that the Nu is 
the only undammed major river of China and a few of the project sites are affecting the 
UNESCO world heritage site ‘Three parallel rivers’.  
On the other (former) undammed river, the Yarlung Tsangpo, is since 2011 a first 
hydropower station under construction, the 510 MW Zanwun dam. Subsequently a major 
cascade is scheduled on the Yarlung Tsangpo. 
Beside these mostly large or even mega dams along the main stem of the rivers a number of 
other hydropower stations are finished, under construction and/or planned within the 
respective watershed. In the other three relevant waterheds of Yunnan (Irrawaddy, Red 
River and Nanpan) a large number of moderate to large hydropower stations are presently 
coming up.  
Most of those projects feed into one of the three major transmission lines, which send power 
to the economic hubs of China’s east and south coast. The development of an effective grid 
is an integrative part of China’s hydropower strategy.  
 
(Photo: Hennig, 2006)   
Fig. 6. The 108 MW Dayin-1 hydropower station on the Dayin/Tarpein river was finished in 
2007. It was the first of a series of 6 cascades in the Chinese-Burmese border region. The dam 
is located in a protected area. It was constructed by private entrepreneurs from the Chinese 
east coast and was later purchased by the state-owned Guodian Corp.  
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Part of that is also the construction of an efficient UHV-DC transmission system. China is 
presently the only country building such a network. Since 2010 the first line connects 
Yunnan with Guangdong (5,000 MW) and a second line between Yunnan and Shanghai 
(6,400 MW) is under construction. Their DC-voltage level of 800 kV is far above the present 
existing maximum of 500-600 kV.  
At present there are in Yunnan 157 hydropower CDM projects approved, another 110 are at 
validation (http://cd4cdm.org; 09.Sept.2011). Most of those projects are small hydropower 
stations (SHP). Surprising in that context is also, that the majority of SHPs in Yunnan are 
grid feeding and an integral part of the power transfer. Beside the omnipresence of SHPs in 
Yunnan, there are two major SHP hubs existing. This is a cluster of SHPs and some bigger 
projects within a small area and each has a cumulative installed capacity of about 1,000 MW. 
Yunnan’s two SHP-hubs are in the Fugong-county of Nujiang-prefecture and in Yingjiang-
county of Dehong-prefecture.  Recent studies in Yingjiang indicate serious environmental 
cumulative consequences of the recent SHP-development. Cascades of SHPs, which are 
according to international classifications mid-sized projects, result in the drying up of a 
number of smaller rivers in the dry season. This is caused by water diversion and the failure 
of ensuring a riparian distance between the hydro projects and the failure of enforcing a 
minimum water discharge.  
3.3 Environmental and socio-economic challenges of the hydropower development in 
SW-China and NE-India 
China as well as India officially reject the famous and influential 2001 report by the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD). However, both governments are not averse to international 
cooperation. Their domestic hydropower and dam legislation policy, which includes 
resettlement issues as well as Environment Impact Assessment, has been influenced by 
international debates and by their own characteristic domestic learning policy. Despite not 
recognizing the WCD-guidelines, hydropower projects which are internationally funded 
(e.g. from WB, ADB, IPC or from Western donors) have to follow the rules by the World 
Commission on Dams. This counts also for hydel projects requesting for CDM.  
Whether or not hydropower projects are constructed is decided in both countries on the 
basis of their assessment of their economic development and the related energy needs. 
Comparing both states over the last two decades it is peculiar that China’s hydropower 
sector is growing faster than predicted, while India’s is growing more slowly than expected 
and needed.  
Despite this simple characteristic the hydropower sector in both states belongs to the fastest 
growing worldwide. This impressive growth is naturally accompanied by certain 
environmental and socio-economic problems and challenges. Following a few of these 
challenges are explained and discussed more detailed.  
3.3.1 Environmental and resettlement policy in China (Yunnan) 
There are currently about 23 million registered relocatees in China (Hensengerth, 2010) and 
according to the WCD-report between 1949 and 1999 about 12 million people were 
displaced due to reservoir construction. Millions more were displaced due to the 
construction of the Three Gorges Dam and other large hydropower schemes. In many cases 
people were moved to other areas and provinces, which raised assimilation problems and 
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resulted in conflicts with the resident population (Heggelund, 2006). Growing problems 
related to resettlement were solved by passing a number of new laws and regulations. Now 
the implementation of newly approved resettlement plans are in the responsibility of county 
and sometimes even provincial governments, while the monitoring and evaluation are 
carried out by external agencies.  
The immense and steadily growing costs of resettlements are a major objective of the lack of 
new hydropower projects in the more densely populated areas of eastern and southern China. 
Only prestigious and important projects like the controversial Danjiangkou reservoir as part of 
the S-N-water transfer project get acceptance. It is with 350,000 people the largest present 
resettlement project and one of the very few Chinese projects which are heavy delayed. 
Studies by the author of recent hydropower related relocation projects in Yunnan 
(interviews conducted in 2010 and 2011) indicate that they were done according to the 
Chinese rules. Relocated villagers (incl. village committees) do not complain about the 
relocation itself, but about the intransparent decision making and the lack of participating in 
relevant decision making and co-determination.  
The development of the Chinese Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) since 1979 is the 
result of domestic learning processes and the studies of international examples and 
experiences and underlying therefore frequent modifications.  
Chinese formal EIA-procedures are according to the international standards but however 
their implementation is often doubtful. In some cases the EIA got published and approved 
only after the hydropower project was constructed. Additionally public disclosure of the 
entire EIA report is not necessary and only summaries of EIAs have to get published. For 
strengthening the EIA-procedure many hydropower projects have now to get reviewed and 
approved by either provincial or even central authorities. Despite the often still weak EIA-
implementation a few cases spurred the debate on hydropower projects in Yunnan:  
1. In June 2009 China's Ministry of Environment Protection halted two large hydropower 
projects along the Jinsha river (Upper Yangtze). The move was considered as the 
severest punishment in the country's environmental appraisal history as it involved two 
large state-owned conglomerates Huadian (with the 2,200 MW Ludila project) and 
Huaneng (with the 1,700 MW Longkaikou). But in November 2010 the mighty National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) gave official clearance. In that context 
the 2,400 MW Jin’AnQiao project on the same river, which is the first and largest private 
funded LHP in China, got in 2010 the formal EIA-approval only just before finishing the 
construction. 
2. The development of the Nu river cascade is halted since 2004 and subjected to 
environmental investigation. The Nu or Salween is an international river and its 
development is therefore a central government responsibility under the charge of the 
Yangtze Water resource commission. Although first ideas about the Nu-projects came 
up in the 1970s, only in 1999 the NDRC adopted a plan of a cascade based on 13 dams 
with a combined capacity of 23 GW. The proposed developer, state owned Huadian 
Corp., tried together with the provincial government of Yunnan to rush China’s State 
Council into approving the projects before the new EIA-law could come into effect in 
2003. China’s former SEPA (now Ministry of Environmental Protection) and a Beijing-
based NGO began to organize national and even international opposition to the project. 
This resulted in an unique situation for China, establishing a link between researchers, 
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NGO activists and also politicians. Huadian was forced to conduct an EIA and submit it 
to the SEPA. Finally in 2004 then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao put the project on hold due 
to an insufficient EIA. In between the EIA report had been completed and approved by 
the SEPA for a reduced number of dams, also their number is contradictional. The 
present situation is still diffuse, despite many hints of an upcoming official approval of 
the stop are existing. But on the other side, preliminary work is under progress and 
beside Huadian is now also Guodian active in the region, as seen in a field trip by the 
author in early 2011. 
3. Beside the Nu-cascade the most controversial hydropower project in China is the 2,800 
MW Upper Hutiaoxiao project in Yunnan. The proposed dam, with a height of 276m 
would officially relocate more than 100,000 people, mostly minorities; unofficial the 
number is much higher. The location is on the Tiger Leaping gorge on the Jinsha (Upper 
Yangtze), one of the worldwide most spectacular canyons. The proposed dam was also 
aimed at diverting water from the Jinsha to the provincial capital Kunming which lacks 
drinking water. The plan opposed by Chinese NGOs caused an unexpected public 
outcry, which was supported by Chinese Media and it received also international 
attention. Therefore the plan has been shelved since 2004 and in late 2007 the project 
was cancelled due to a report by The South China Morning Post. But so far no official 
statement was given. 
These examples about environmental and socio-economic issues present a mixed picture 
about China’s hydropower decision making process. On the one side the process is still 
secretive, top-down oriented and authoritarian, but on the other side democratic procedures 
get introduced and in certain cases individuals and civil society organisations can organize 
effective protests and even stop controversial projects. How is the comparable situation in 
India? 
3.3.2 Environmental and resettlement policy in India (northeast India) 
India ranks fourth in the world in terms of the number of its large dams, but after China it 
ranks second in terms of displaced people. The main objective for dam construction is 
irrigation, but in the last years there is also clear trend towards hydropower. Although the 
government is the owner of almost all those dams, there exists no official data concerning 
resettlements. It is estimated that in India between 32 and 56 million people were displaced 
up to the new millennia, most of them in tribal areas (Choudhury, 2010).  
Compared to China’s top-down authoritarian decision making on dams, in India it is more 
akin of a polycentric process which involves at various stages multiple actors.   
In its young history India faced many serious tensions about the utilization of water 
resources, most of them were interstate conflicts. But with the controversy over the Sardar 
Sarovar Multipurpose project in the late 1980s began in India to emerge an era of social and 
environmental movements and civil-society-driven consciousness-building. The civil-society 
became the major actor working towards progressive and gradual changes in dam related 
policies (Choudhury, 2010).  
The role of public participation is historically limited, similar to China’s situation. But what 
changed in India is the relevance of the environmental sphere, namely the compulsory 
public hearing, relevant for the EIA documents. Those public hearing became one of the 
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most contested and controversial arenas, strongly affected by civil society organisations and 
environmental and social activists as well as the local communities.  
These civil societal organisations and activists criticize the quality of many EIA-reports, 
which are poor in many social and environmental aspects, their inadequate baseline 
information and additionally act often only as a post-clearance study. Contrary to China, 
India’s ‘Right to Information Act’ binds the government to make all the relevant documents 
public accessible (e.g. Feasibility study, Enviromental Impact Assessment, etc.). 
In case of NHPC’s 3,000 MW Dibang-Multipurpose project in Arunachal, which will have 
India’s highest gravity dam (288m), it came also to serious opposition and public awareness 
campaigns. For the first time civil society organisations from an upstream state (Arunachal) 
jointly engaged in agitation with organisations from a downstream state (Assam).  
Also as a reaction to the strong criticism of the civil societal organisations towards the public 
hearing and the EIA-documents the then Union Minister of State for Power, Jairam Ramesh, 
now Environment Minister, raised concern about the ‘MoU-virus’ of Northeastern States 
like Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. He referred to the large number of projects handed out 
by these states to private hydropower developers, whereas most of these agreements have 
been accompanied by huge monetary advances. Often they were signed before compulsory 
public consultations or mandatory clearances (Vagholikar & Das, 2010).    
As a result to those critiques many hydropower projects in Northeast India got seriously 
delayed. None of the many large (> 500 MW) hydro projects by private players are finished 
so far. Also the state-owned NHPC, which is on the forefront of hydropower development, 
commissioned till now only the 510 MW Tista-V project; and in 2012 the 2,000 MW Lower 
Subansiri is following.  
Also resulting from those critiques with the well-known environmental and socio-economic 
impacts of large scaled hydropower projects, a few Indian state governments encouraged 
the development of run-off-river (RoR) type projects. In that context quite a few LHPs had 
being converted and split from proposed storage schemes in the Pre Feasibility Reports to 
one and often even more than one RoR-schemes, which have been allotted to private 
developers for project implementations. On the other side there is strong opposition of 
conversion of more storage schemes into RoR-schemes, because the multipurpose-function 
of reservoirs (flood control, irrigation, drinking water supply) gets reduced which results in 
higher power tariffs.  
4. Hydropower development in transboundary watersheds of SE-Asia 
Finally a short overview should be given about international hydropower ambitions of both 
countries as well as about implications for transboundary watersheds.  
4.1 China and India overseas hydropower activities 
Over the last decades Chinese dam builders have accumulated a vast expertise and knowledge 
base in hydropower construction. Getting economically strong and based on growing financial 
reserves, Chinese state owned dam builders and financiers appeared on the global 
hydropower market with a bang in the early years of the new century. They started to take on 
large and often destructive projects in countries like Myanmar (former Burma) or Sudan, 
www.intechopen.com
 Hydropower – Practice and Application 316 
which had previously been shunned by the international community. Their emergence 
threatened to roll back progress regarding human rights and the environment which civil 
society had achieved over many years (Bosshard, 2010; Mc Donald et al., 2009).  
However, the situation is changing and Chinese dam builders and financiers are trying to 
become good corporate citizens rather than rogue players on the global market. Presently 
about 40 foreign hydropower stations are completed and more than 200 are under 
construction or planned. Chinese hydropower activities are global, but the majority of the 
projects are in Southeast Asia and Africa where China has fostered strategic regional and 
bilateral ties. The major actors and drivers of Chinese overseas hydropower ambitions are the 
six major state owned power suppliers, but also companies like Sinohydro, China Southern 
Power Grid, various Chinese Banks (mainly China Exim Bank) and Yunnan based companies.  
For Chinese hydropower activities abroad Yunnan plays a crucial role due to its geopolitical 
position close to Southeast Asia. A number of projects in Myanmar are of direct relevance to 
Yunnan, like the cascade of six dams along the Upper Irrawaddy (11,160 MW); two dams on 
the Salween (Upper Thanlwin – 2,400 MW and Tasang – 7,100 MW); as well as four other 
dams on the Shweli and Dayin/Tarpein rivers. Some of the projects caused political tensions 
between the countries, because a number of hydel projects are in areas which are controlled 
by various rebel groups (Shan, Kachin, etc.). These groups are partly blaming Chinese 
companies for doing other activities than hydropower construction and in 2009 even 
attacked a hydropower construction side. Further Myanmar surprisingly suspended in late 
2011 a key project, the $3.6 billion Myitsone dam, causing diplomatic irritations. 
Most of Chinese hydropower projects in Myanmar are on a 40 years BOT basis and therefore 
they get directly connected to Yunnan’s power grid for transmission which transfers 
Myanmar’s electricity to the load centers along the Chinese coast. Beside the strong activities 
in Myanmar, Yunnan sends further electricity to energy hungry North-Vietnam and in 
future also to Thailand.   
Contrary to Chinese global hydropower activities, India’s dam building abroad is quite 
moderate and only in the beginning. Except a relative active global hydropower consultancy 
business (mainly by the state-owned WAPCOS), India’s foreign dam projects concentrate 
only in the neighborhood (e.g. Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar).  
In particular India and Bhutan have agreed to realize 10 LHPs with a combined capacity of 
11.6 GW which should feed in future into the Indian Grid. So far only three projects are 
under construction and one is finished, despite India has committed to draw already 10 GW 
by 2020 from Bhutan. Even more difficult is the situation with Nepal, which has with 42 GW 
by far the highest economic exploitable potential in the Himalayan region, but has still only 
an installed capacity of 0.7 GW and faces therefore an ongoing power crisis (cp. Fig. 3). 
Although India has been assisting Nepal for long in the development of its SHP sector, but 
the prestigious projects which are already for many years under discussion at various 
mutual interest levels have not been realized so far. These large projects should also straight 
feed into the Indian grid.  
Compared to China’s very active hydropower activities in Myanmar, India pursues 
presently only two large projects of a strategic venture in Myanmar, the Tamanthi 1,200 MW 
and Shwesayay 600 MW. Although the MoUs were already signed in 2004, the projects are 
still not realized.  
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Comparing the global hydropower activities, it is striking that in both countries the drivers 
are the state owned power generation, transmission and design as well as consultancy 
companies. Hydropower is seen as a strategic venture. China became here over the last 
decade very successful and has been realizing many projects, both in its neighborhood as 
well as globally. Contrary India’s engagement in its neighborhood is characterized more by 
discussion instead of realization. Additionally is China entering into the hydropower 
markets of India’s Himalayan neighbors, mainly Nepal.  
4.2 Transboundary watershed policy 
Further a short overview about implications for transboundary watersheds should be given. 
In particular for the Lancang/Mekong river exist quite a few studies e.g. Grumbine & Xu, 
2011; Osborne, 2009. China is with Yunnan and Guangxi part of the GMS-initiative but it is 
not part of Mekong River Commission. In particular the serious drought which affected in 
2010 the region, produced controversial discussions and argumentations between upstream 
Yunnan (or China) and downstream states about the causes and effects of damming up 
Yunnan’s Lancang/Mekong River. Beside these discussions also the downstream Mekong 
states plan the construction of another 13 major dams in the lower part of the Mekong. The 
developers of those projects are mainly from China and from Thailand, but also from 
Vietnam and France.  
For the binational watershed of the Nu/Salween- river it is striking that China stopped so 
far damming up its own part of the river but is again, together with Thailand, very active in 
the hydropower development along the Salween in Myanmar. 
The hydropower-development of the transboundary and geopolitically conflictual West-
Himalayan regions is based on the Indus-Water treaty from 1960. Contrary to all the 
tensions between India and Pakistan there are so far no serious geopolitical tensions about 
the realization of all the projects along the Indus and its tributaries, which are shared 
between the two nations. The situation may change, because recently tensions arose about 
the proposed 330 MW Kishanganga hydroproject along the Neelum River where India and 
Pakistan disagree on the application of the provisions of the Treaty. In 2011 Pakistan had 
approached the international court of arbitration constituted by the United Nations against 
the Indian move to construct the hydel project by diverting the Neelum River.  
Pakistan’s ongoing power shortage should be faced by a massive hydropower development 
of its economic exploitable potential of more than 55 GW. Contrary to India is China here 
involved in a few hydropower projects and the number may soon increase. However in 2011 
caused the 1,100 MW Kohala-project on the Jhelum-river political tensions between the two 
countries.  
More serious is the oncoming conflict on the Yarlung Tsangpo where China and India are 
directly involved. The River which is called Brahmaputra in India and Siang in Arunachal is 
so far hardly dammed up, but huge and very prestigious projects are in the pipeline. In 
early 2011 China officially announced the first dam along the Yarlung Tsangpo which 
caused a political outcry in India. In direct response to China’s plan of constructing a 
proposed 40 GW project (double of the Three Gorges Dam) on the famous bend of the 
Yarlung Tsangpo, India revived its idea of constructing a 10 GW project on the Upper Siang. 
This would be by far India’s largest hydel project. New Delhi is pushing state-owned power 
companies (namely NTPC and NHPC) and the Arunachal government to speed up with 
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their own projects on the river. Background is the doctrine of prior appropriation, which 
indicates that the priority right for the river falls to its first user.  
5. Conclusion 
China as well as India are characterized by the globally fastest growing hydropower 
development. Over the past decades China gained an engineering and technical expertise, 
which made it by far the worldwide most advanced hydropower market. Additionally 
China is economically so strong that it can realize a big number of large and expensive 
hydel projects. Since the new millennia China’s expertise and financial strength is also 
globally seen, because it is constructing and funding a fast growing number of hydro power 
projects worldwide.  
Contrary to China is India still depending on foreign technology. This is true enough in 
particular for very large projects or projects in difficult terrains. Additional India is, despite 
various political initiatives, not able to finance a larger number of big hydel projects parallel. 
The path of India’s hydro capacity generation, both in India itself but also due to its strategic 
partnerships in neighboring states, has been very slow. In particular for Northeast-India 
with its huge hydropower potential, projected implementation has been dismal so far. 
In both countries hydropower used to be a part of classical multipurpose projects, whereas 
power generation was often the means for large scaled irrigation projects. Today (hydro-) 
power generation is essential for sustaining the economic growth and therefore large hydro 
projects are part of regional development initiatives. This results also from the fact that the 
highest hydropower potential is far away from the load centers and their economic and 
urban hubs. While China uses this opportunity for developing economically peripheral 
regions and developing and fostering the globally most advanced grid and transmission 
systems India is not able to do similar.  
The driver for China’s as well as in India’s hydropower development is the government, 
both on the central as well on the provincial /local level. In particular the NE-states  
of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh signed plenty of Memoranda of 
Understandings/Agreements with private players, but still many of that signed projects 
have not been realized so far. 
The other major drivers are the state-owned power generation, transmission and design 
companies. Private companies play in both countries for large projects only a minor role so 
far. However in India’s context the government tries eagerly to involve also the private 
sector, mostly on BOT basis. But due to the high initial investments, private companies are 
still hesitating.  
Compared to the LHP-sector the small hydropower development is in both countries quite 
successful pushed by the governments. Most of the investments came here from the local 
private sector, and many of the recent SHP-projects are applying for CDM.   
Both countries reject officially the WCD guidelines but their decision making process 
differentiates. China is following in its hydropower policy a classical authoritarian top-
down approach. The decision making on dam development is based on domestic laws, 
which adopt gradual global norms. Despite this progress the environmental implications 
and to some extend also the social consequences of hydropower decision making are still 
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not transparent at all. Despite this critique, get some projects surprisingly halted up for a 
while or some even stopped.  
Contrary to China, is India’s hydropower decision making more akin of a polycentric 
process which involves at various stages multiple actors. Despite the critique of civil societal 
organisations and environmental as well as social activists over poor EIA-reports is India’s 
decision making quite transparent, in particular that all the relevant documents are 
publically accessible. However due to the quite active civil society structures, the 
implementation of many hydropower projects has been slow and causes often a 
restructuring of many projects.  
The main critique by the author is that in both states hydropower development is seen as 
the only tool for watershed development. There is no serious assessment for developing a 
concept of the whole watershed which goes far beyond hydropower. This concept should 
create an innovative management model, which considers water, environment, livelihood, 
food security, etc. and therefore enhancing public participation and transparency as well as 
financial benefits for the people in the watershed. 
This is underpinned by the fact that most of the rivers in Asia’s watertower (from the 
Karakorum over the Himalayas to the Hengduan Mountains) are transboundary rivers. 
Therefore should be a shift from a sovereign state-focused watershed development to an 
integrated transboundary watershed approach which also recognizes political sensitivities 
of the whole region. 
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